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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
The Zoning Hearing Board ("ZHB") of Easttown Township 
("Township") appeals the District Court's order directing it 
to allow Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, L.P . 
("Omnipoint") to erect a telecommunications tower at a 
designated site within the Township. The ZHB contends 
that the District Court erred in finding that the ZHB's 
decision denying Omnipoint's application was not 
supported by substantial evidence as requir ed by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("TCA"), 47 U.S.C. 
S 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). Omnipoint argues that the District Court 
was correct on that score and cross-appeals the District 
Court's decision denying it damages and attor neys' fees 
under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1983. We conclude 
that the District Court erred in its analysis of the relevant 
state law. Accordingly, we will reverse its order and remand 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. 
 
Omnipoint, a wireless Personal Communications Service 
("PCS") provider, entered into a lease with the Or Shalom 
Synagogue ("Synagogue"), located in Easttown T ownship, to 
erect and operate a communications tower on a portion of 
its property. The proposed white fibr eglass tower was to be 
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approximately 110 feet tall, with a diameter of 24 inches at 
its base and tapering to 16 inches at the top. Omnipoint 
planned to enclose the base of the tower in a 30-foot by 30- 
foot structure and surround it with an eight-foot tall chain- 
link fence topped with barbed wire. To r educe the aesthetic 
impact of the tower, Omnipoint suggested using it as a 
flagpole, though it conceded that the tower would be taller 
and wider than a normal flagpole. 
 
Because the Synagogue property was located in a district 
zoned AA-residential and the Township's zoning ordinance 
imposed a height limitation of 35 feet in such ar eas, 
Omnipoint submitted an application to the ZHB for a use 
variance in order to erect its tower . See 53 P.S. S 10910.2. 
In the alternative, Omnipoint also submitted a challenge to 
the validity of the ordinance under the Pennsylvania 
Constitution and the TCA. See 53 P.S.S 10916.1. 
Omnipoint alleged that the ordinance was invalid under the 
Pennsylvania Constitution because it excluded wir eless 
facilities and under the TCA because it had the ef fect of 
prohibiting wireless service. 
 
The ZHB held public hearings on three separate dates 
over the course of several months to discuss Omnipoint's 
application. At these hearings, Omnipoint contended that 
the tower was necessary to fill a "gap" in its service in the 
southern portion of the Township and of fered the testimony 
of several expert witnesses in support of its application. The 
Township, on the other hand, called only one witness, its 
Manager, who testified that the challenged ordinance was 
not exclusionary because it had been interpr eted to permit 
special exceptions for cellular facilities in certain areas of 
the Township, such as the B-business districts.1 Numerous 
Township residents also attended the hearings and 
expressed their opposition to the siting of the tower, largely 
on the basis that it would be an eyesore in the residential 
community in which it was to be situated. 
 
At the conclusion of the hearings, the ZHB denied 
Omnipoint's application, stating its decision orally at one of 
its meetings and issuing a 10-page statement offindings 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The ordinance has since been amended to explicitly permit personal 
wireless service facilities in selected ar eas of the Township. 
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and conclusions on a later date. With r egard to the use 
variance request, the ZHB found that local zoning law 
places a high burden on the applicant to demonstrate why 
a variance is necessary and that Omnipoint had failed to do 
so.2 With regar d to the validity challenge under state law, 
the ZHB found that the ordinance had been interpreted "to 
allow cellular/PCS facilities in certain appr opriate zoning 
districts" within the Township and that, in fact, there were 
"several cellular or PCS towers or sites operating within the 
Township borders" and in contiguous ar eas (A. 30-31). As 
a result, the ordinance could not be said to be 
exclusionary. The ZHB also observed that the T ownship's 
justification for the challenged ordinance--namely, 
"preservation of the residential natur e of the AA residential 
districts"--falls "within the traditional purposes of zoning 
regulation, and enforcement of zoning r egulations is not 
negated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 or [by 
Pennsylvania law]" (A. 26, 30). Finally, the ZHB rejected the 
challenge under the TCA, concluding that the or dinance did 
not effectively prohibit wireless service. 
 
In the District Court, Omnipoint did not challenge the 
ZHB's conclusion that it had failed to justify a use variance.3 
It did, however, continue to argue that the ordinance was 
unconstitutional because it was exclusionary. Omnipoint 
further insisted that the ZHB's decision upholding the 
validity of the zoning ordinance was violative of the TCA 
because it was not supported by substantial evidence, 47 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Under Pennsylvania law, one seeking a use variance must show that 
the zoning restriction "inflicts unnecessary hardship on the applicant," 
and (1) that there are unique physical cir cumstances or conditions 
peculiar to the property that create the hardship, (2) that because of 
these circumstances or conditions, ther e is no possibility that the 
property can be developed in conformity with the zoning ordinance, (3) 
that the applicant did not create the unnecessary hardship, (4) that the 
variance, if granted, would not alter the essential character of the area, 
and (5) that the variance, if granted, would r epresent the least 
modification possible to the regulation at issue. 53 P.S. S 10910.2. 
 
3. It is undisputed that there are no"unique physical circumstances or 
conditions peculiar to the property [such that] there is no possibility 
[of] 
the property [being] developed in confor mity with the zoning ordinance." 
53 P.S. S 10910.2. 
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U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), and because it had the effect of 
prohibiting wireless service. 47 U.S.C.S 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). 
Finally, Omnipoint sought damages and attorneys' fees 
under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1983. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Omnipoint and ordered the ZHB to grant Omnipoint's 
application. It found that the ZHB's decision was"based 
solely on the negative aesthetic impact of the tower" and 
"did not make any findings that the tower would affect the 
health, safety, or general welfare of the T ownship in any 
manner other than that of aesthetics." Omnipoint 
Communications Enterprises, L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Board of 
Easttown Township, 72 F. Supp. 2d 512, 516 (E.D. Pa. 
2000). The Court further concluded as a matter of 
Pennsylvania law that aesthetic concerns alone were "not 
sufficient to uphold the validity of the or dinance." Id. Since 
the Court found there was no evidence other than of 
negative aesthetic impact to support the ordinance, it held 
that the ZHB's decision violated the substantial evidence 
requirement of the TCA.4 
 
Having found the ordinance unconstitutional on this 
ground, the District Court deemed it unnecessary to 
address whether Omnipoint had shown the or dinance to be 
impermissibly exclusionary under Pennsylvania law or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Court also expressed the view that the "general concerns voiced 
by the Township residents" would not constitute "substantial evidence" 
under the TCA even if a restriction on land use could be supported by 
aesthetic considerations alone under Pennsylvania law. However, as we 
demonstrate in the text, infra, Slip. Op. at 6-7, the validity of the 
ordinance under the Pennsylvania Constitution is not an issue that 
turns on adjudicative facts that requir e substantial record support under 
the TCA. The Township's zoning ordinance limiting the district to 
residential uses and imposing a 35 foot height restriction represents a 
legislative judgment about land use planning. If there are legislative 
facts 
that the decision makers could have viewed as supporting their 
judgment, record evidence is not r equired under the TCA. See APT 
Pittsburgh Ltd. v. Penn Township, Butler County, 196 F.3d 469, 475 (3d 
Cir. 1999). As we also point out, infra , Slip Op. at 10-11, this is not a 
case like Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Boar d of Pine Grove 
Township, 181 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 1999), where we were called upon to 
review a zoning board's denial of an application for a special exception." 
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whether the ZHB's decision was in violation of subsection 
332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) of the TCA because it had the ef fect of 
prohibiting wireless services. See id.  at 516-17. With regard 
to Omnipoint's civil rights claims based on the TCA 
violation, the Court found that the TCA's remedial scheme 
is "sufficiently comprehensive to infer Congressional intent 
to foreclose a S 1983 remedy." Id. at 517 (quoting Omnipoint 
v. Newtown Township, No. 98-5171, 1999 WL 269936, at 
*7-10 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 1999)). The Court also concluded 
that Omnipoint's claim for section 1983 relief under a 
substantive due process analysis failed because it found no 
evidence of an improper motive and because the ZHB's 
decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Id. 
 
II. 
 
Subsection 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) of the TCA requir es that "[a]ny 
decision by a State or local government or instrumentality 
thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify 
personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and 
supported by substantial evidence contained in a written 
record." Substantial evidence is a legal term of art. It "does 
not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, `but 
rather such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.' " Pier ce v. Underwood, 
487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. 
v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). A court r eviewing 
under the substantial evidence standard "is not to weigh 
the evidence contained in that record or substitute its own 
conclusions for those of the fact finder," but rather is to 
"determine whether there is substantial evidence in the 
record as a whole to support the challenged decision." 
AT&T Wireless v. Zoning Boar d of Adjustment of the Borough 
of Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d 64, 71 (3d Cir . 1999). 
 
The District Court in this case correctly observed that 
"[s]ection 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) is not intended to supplant the 
substantive standards to be applied under state or local 
law." Easttown, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 515; see also Omnipoint 
Communications Enterprises, L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Board of 
Pine Grove Township, 181 F.3d 403, 408 (3d Cir. 1999); APT 
Pittsburgh Ltd. v. Penn Township, Butler County, 196 F.3d 
469, 475 (3d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the first step for the 
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court in a case in which the provider of wir eless services is 
relying on state or local law is to identify the relevant issues 
under that law. If those issues requirefindings of 
adjudicative fact, the local authority's resolution of those 
factual issues must be supported by substantial evidence. 
Otherwise, any conclusion based on those findings violates 
subsection 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) and cannot stand. 
 
Thus, as we pointed out in Penn Township : 
 
       [i]t . . . seems apparent that subsection 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) 
       is intended to provide procedural pr otections with 
       respect to the determination of factual issues made by 
       a state or local authority in the course of applying state 
       and local zoning law. . . . By contrast, it also seems 
       apparent that subsection 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) is not 
       intended to apply to decisions that are not to be made 
       solely on the basis of the factual recor d before the 
       agency and that are not to be the subject of deferential 
       substantial evidence review. 
 
       . . . 
 
       A decision on the "exclusivity" of a zoning or dinance 
       under the Pennsylvania Constitution is a legal issue 
       that is not subject to deferential judicial r eview. See 
       Borough of Edgewood v. Lamanti's Pizzaria, 556 A.2d 
       22 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989). While such decisions may 
       involve some consideration of legislative facts, the 
       evidence to be considered is not limited to the facts of 
       the particular applicant's case and is not necessarily 
       limited to the record compiled by the local authority. 
 
Id. at 474-75. 
 
As we have noted, Omnipoint did rely on state law before 
the ZHB. It insisted that the ordinance barring it from 
erecting its tower was invalid under the Pennsylvania 
Constitution because it excluded wireless service towers. 
The law applicable to this kind of claim is well settled. 
Zoning ordinances in Pennsylvania enjoy a pr esumption of 
constitutionality and validity, and the party challenging one 
bears the "heavy burden" of proving otherwise. See Penn 
Township, 196 F.3d at 475 (quoting Benham v. Board of 
Supervisors of Middletown Township, 349 A.2d 484, 487 
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(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975)); see also Schubach v. Silver, 336 
A.2d 328, 335 (Pa. 1975); Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Zoning 
Hearing Board of the Borough of Osbor ne, 285 A.2d 501, 
503-04 (Pa. 1971) ("the validity of a zoning or dinance is 
presumed and . . . the burden of establishing its invalidity 
is upon the party who seeks to have it declar ed invalid"). 
 
In order to overcome this presumption of 
constitutionality, the challenger must demonstrate that "the 
ordinance totally excludes an otherwise legitimate use." 
Ferrell v. Worchester Township Board of Supervisors, 481 
A.2d 986, 989 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984). "Unless the 
challenger demonstrates that the ordinance in question 
completely or effectively excludes a legitimate use, . . . the 
challenger has failed to carry its burden . . .." Ficco v. 
Board of Supervisors of Hempfield Township, 677 A.2d 897, 
899 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (citing BAC, Inc. v. Board of 
Supervisors of Millcreek Township, 633 A.2d 144 (Pa. 
1993)); Overstreet v. Zoning Hearing Boar d of Schuylkill 
Township, 618 A.2d 1108 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). To prove 
total or effective exclusion of a permitted use, the 
challenger can show that the ordinance is either de jure or 
de facto exclusionary: 
 
       De jure exclusion exists where an or dinance, on its 
       face, totally bans a legitimate use. De facto exclusion 
       exists where an ordinance permits a use on its face, 
       but when applied acts to prohibit the use thr oughout 
       the municipality. 
 
Penn Township, 196 F.3d at 475 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
 
If the challenger is able to establish that the or dinance 
excludes the use in question, the burden then shifts to the 
state or locality "to demonstrate that the zoning ordinance 
`[b]ears a substantial relationship to public health, safety, 
and welfare.' " Id. (quoting Borough of Edgewood v. 
Lamanti's Pizzeria, 556 A.2d 22, 24 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1989)); 53 P.S. S 10916.1(a)(5)(i)-(v); see also Fernley v. 
Board of Supervisors of Schuylkill Township, 502 A.2d 585, 
587 (Pa. 1985) ("Where the challenger pr oves a total 
prohibition of a legitimate use, the bur den shifts to the 
municipality to establish that the prohibition promotes 
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public health, safety, morals and general welfar e.") (citing 
Beaver Gasoline, 285 A.2d at 503); Ellick v. Board of 
Supervisors, 333 A.2d 239, 243-44 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975). 
 
The District Court did not apply these state authorities. 
As we have noted, it expressed no view with r egard to the 
ZHB's conclusion that Omnipoint had failed to show that 
the ordinance was exclusionary. Rather, it held that the 
ordinance restricting the AA-residential district to 
residential and related uses and to structures no higher 
than 35 feet was unconstitutional because zoning"based 
solely on aesthetic reasons [is] not a legitimate exercise of 
a locality's power to protect the general welfare." Easttown, 
72 F. Supp. 2d at 515. 
 
We hold that the District Court's conclusion is contrary 
to Pennsylvania law. Residential districts with 35 foot high 
restrictions are, of course, a common feature of virtually all 
municipal zoning ordinances. See 2 Anderson, American 
Law of Zoning (4th ed. 1996) S 39.55 ("The most common 
provisions limit buildings in single family r esidential 
districts to . . . a height not in excess of 35 feet."). While 
such reasonable height restrictions have been justified on 
grounds other than aesthetics, see id., we are confident 
that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would sustain 
them as a reasonable means of maintaining the r esidential 
character of the neighborhood. Pennsylvania courts have 
repeatedly held that aesthetic considerations promote the 
general welfare and thus are sufficient to justify the 
exercise of a locality's police power to establish zoning 
ordinances. See e.g. Appeal of Girsch, 263 A.2d 395, 399 
(Pa. 1970) ("Certainly, [a municipality] may protect its 
attractive character by requiring apartments to be built in 
accordance with (reasonable) set-back, open space, height, 
and other light-and-air requirements. . . ."); Best v. Zoning 
Board of Adjustment of the City of Pittsbur gh, 141 A.2d 606, 
612 (Pa. 1958) ("If the legislature has the power to compel 
a property owner to submit to a forced sale for the 
purposes of creating an attractive community, it has the 
power to regulate his property for such objectives."); Board 
of Supervisors of Thampton Township v. Gentsch , 414 A.2d 
1102, 1105 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) (stating that "a 
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municipality can protect its attractive character by 
imposing reasonable height restrictions").5 
 
In arriving at the conclusion that zoning decisions based 
on aesthetics are not a legitimate exer cise of a locality's 
police power, the District Court erroneously relied on cases 
in which Pennsylvania courts have requir ed "extraordinary 
justification" to overcome a presumption that restrictions 
on residential lot sizes or other attempts to"establish 
residential enclaves by excluding population gr owth" 
constitute exclusionary zoning and are unduly r estrictive of 
property rights. Surrick v. Zoning Boar d of Upper Providence 
Township, 382 A.2d 105, 108 (Pa. 1978). See Kirk v. Zoning 
Hearing Board of Honey Brook, 713 A.2d 1226, 1229 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1998); Berman v. Board of Commissioners, 
Township of Lower Merion, 608 A.2d 585 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1992). It is true that when such restrictions are at issue, 
Pennsylvania courts have held that they "may not be 
sustained solely on the basis of aesthetics alone." Berman, 
608 A.2d at 590 (quoting National Land Investment Co. v. 
Easttown Board of Adjustment, 215 A.2d 597, 610 n.29 (Pa. 
1965)). But this is not the type of ordinance at issue here, 
and thus the Court's reliance on these cases is misplaced. 
 
The District Court also erroneously relied upon our 
decision in Pine Grove, 181 F .3d 403, for the proposition 
that the aesthetic concerns expressed in this case about 
the proposed tower do not meet the evidentiary standard 
required by the TCA. See 47 U.S.C.S 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). There, 
we held that "a few generalized expressions of concern with 
`aesthetics' cannot serve as substantial evidence" to support 
the denial of a special exception. Id.  at 409 (citing Cellular 
Telephone Company v. Town of Oyster Bay , 166 F.3d 490, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We recognize that the issue we her e resolve is not a federal TCA 
issue. 
As we pointed out in Penn Township, state constitutional law issues of 
this kind do not come within the scope of the "substantial evidence" 
provision of subsection 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). This means that our 
jurisdiction 
to resolve it and that of the District Court emanates from 28 U.S.C. 
S 1367(a) (conferring supplemental jurisdiction to entertain a state law 
claim forming part of the same case or contr oversy). See Omnipoint v. 
Warrington Township, 63 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (recognizing 
that a federal court may have discretion in some circumstances to 
decline to resolve a state claim raised in a similar context). 
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496 (2d Cir. 1999) (same showing not sufficient in the 
denial of a special permit)); 53 P .S. S 10912.1 (governing 
special exceptions). As we have stressed, a r eviewing court 
in a case like this must first identify the issue framed by 
the state or local law. Here the issue, at least as perceived 
by the District Court, was whether the ordinance was 
constitutionally inferior because it did not serve the public 
health, safety, or welfare. Our decision in Pine Grove is 
simply not helpful in resolving that issue. 6 
 
The judgment of the District Court thus rests solely on 
an error of law, and we must reverse. 
 
III. 
 
As we have explained, the District Court found it 
unnecessary to rule on Omnipoint's claim that the 
ordinance was impermissibly exclusionary under 
Pennsylvania law or its claim that the ordinance had the 
effect of prohibiting the provision of wireless services in 
violation of the TCA. Moreover, the r ecord in this case was 
developed without the benefit of our decision in Penn 
Township which addressed similar challenges under the 
Pennsylvania Constitution and the TCA and articulated the 
legal principles that must control here. Under these 
circumstances, we deem it prudent to remand this matter 
to the District Court to give the parties an opportunity to 
supplement the record and to secur e the informed 
judgment of the District Court. 
 
In Penn Township, as here, a wir eless service provider 
claimed that the challenged ordinance was exclusionary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The District Court also cited White Advertising Metro. Inc. v. Zoning 
Hearing Board of Susquehanna Township , 453 A.2d 29, 34-35 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1982) for the proposition that aesthetic considerations are 
not enough to justify a zoning ordinance, but its reliance on that case is 
misplaced as well. At issue in White was whether a local zoning authority 
could deny a conditional use permit, on the basis of aesthetics alone, to 
an applicant who otherwise had met the requir ed "standards and 
criteria" for obtaining such a permit. In that situation, the court held 
that it is not appropriate for a zoning authority to "grant or deny 
permits 
. . . solely by the discretionary exercise of its subjective aesthetic 
judgment." Id. at 35. 
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because a tower in the area of the township in which 
towers were permitted would not allow it adequately to fill 
an alleged gap in its service in another portion of the 
township. We there held: 
 
       Pennsylvania's rule against exclusionary zoning does 
       not impose upon a township the duty to assur e that all 
       providers, regardless of the systems they have chosen 
       to construct, will have a suitable site for a functioning 
       tower within the township. To be exclusionary, the 
       ordinance must effectively foreclose not only APT's use, 
       but all use. Yet, APT provided no evidence to the ZHB 
       that other providers could not use any of the 600 acres 
       of M District land to build a tower that would 
       functionally meet their systems' needs. 
 
Penn Township, 196 F.3d at 477. 
 
In this case, Omnipoint does not contest the ZHB's 
finding that other service providers have existing towers 
within the Township and in contiguous ar eas that provide 
service within its borders. While there is some evidence 
concerning the service of those providers, it is safe to say 
that the record would be more fully developed had the 
parties had the benefit of the teachings of Penn Township. 
 
The same is true with respect to the TCA issue. In Penn 
Township we established a two-prong test to determine if 
the decision of a local zoning authority has "the effect of 
prohibiting the provision of personal wir eless services." 47 
U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). It requir es that the service 
provider first "show that its facility will fill an existing 
significant gap in the ability of remote users to access the 
national telephone network." Penn Township, 196 F.3d at 
480. If this burden is met, the provider must still prove 
"that the manner in which it proposes tofill the significant 
gap in service is the least intrusive on the values that the 
denial sought to serve." Id. A recor d developed with this test 
in mind might well differ materially fr om the record 
currently before us, particularly as it r elates to the second 
prong of the test. 
 
IV. 
 
Omnipoint's remaining claims are based on the Civil 
Rights Act. To the extent Omnipoint claims that the ZHB, 
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acting under color of state law, violated its rights under the 
TCA, the issues raised need not be addressed until such a 
violation has been established. However, to the extent 
Omnipoint claims that the ZHB, acting under color of state 
law, violated its right to substantive due pr ocess, summary 
judgment was properly entered against Omnipoint. The 
summary judgment record reflects only a bona fide 
disagreement concerning land use planning issues. It will 
not support a conclusion that the ZHB has acted arbitrarily 
or capriciously. See e.g. Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shewsbury 
T.P., 808 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
V. 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be r eversed and 
this matter will be remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
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